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Ernst Freund and the First Amendment Tradition
Professor Ernst Freund and Debs v. United States
Harry Kalven, Jr.t
The decision in Debs v. United States1 was handed down by the
United States Supreme Court some fifty-four years ago. It is happily
no longer good law; it is not likely to become law again. It is with little
exception not studied in the law schools, and it is rarely cited or noted
in even the more elaborate casebooks or treatises on constitutional law.2
It might seem, therefore, an antiquarian indulgence for a busy law
review to devote some pages to it, especially for the primary purpose
of reprinting an article from the New Republic, an article which is
also fifty-four years old.3
But the opinion in Debs was written by Justice Holmes; and the
article in the New Republic is a criticism of the case written by Ernst
Freund. Taken together these facts provide important clues to the
intellectual history of the first amendment tradition, a history we had
better understand if we are to hang on to the tradition today. We would
do well to be aware of how far we have traveled and how difficult it was
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
1 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
2 The major exception appears to be G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1061 (8th ed. 1970) (using Debs as a principal case). See also C.
PR1TCHETr, THE AMIERICAN CONSTITUTION 416 (2d ed. 1968) (devoting a few lines' brief to
it). Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 84-85 (rev. ed. 1948) does discuss it. See
text at note 12 infra.
3 Except for the reference to it in Z. CIAFEE, supra note 2, it might well have been
beyond reach for scholarly as well as popular audiences.
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to get here. We need, in Learned Hand's splendid phrase, to have a
sense of our "hard bought acquisition in the fight for freedom."4
The constitutional law dimension of American free speech and
political tolerance dates, as we all know, from the opinion of Justice
Holmes in Schenck v. United States,5 one of the most cited and famous
of American cases. It is that opinion which gave. to the law, and to the
culture, the "clear and present danger" formula for measuring the
reach of the first amendment, and which gave us also the example of
the man falsely shouting fire in the crowded theater. For better or for
worse, and I believe it for worse, the formula and the example have
loomed very large in the subsequent development of first amendment
interpretation."
It has been customary to lavish care and attention on the Schenck
case. The point we need for present purposes is simply that Debs v.
United States had been argued to the Court well before Schenck was
decided and was itself decided March 10, 1919, just one week later than
Schenck. It represented the first effort by Justice Holmes to apply what
he had worked out about freedom of speech in Schenck. The start of
the law of the first amendment is not Schenck; it is Schenck and Debs
read together.
Read freshly with the eyes of today the outcome in Debs is shocking.
Debs was charged with obstructing recruitment for the draft in violation
of the Espionage Act of 1917. He was convicted and given a ten-year
prison sentence.7 His criminal conduct consisted of a public speech
to a general audience in Canton, Ohio. "The main theme of the
speech," Justice Holmes tells us, "was socialism, its growth, and a
prophecy of its ultimate success." In the course of the speech, Debs
expressed sharp criticism of war in general, and of World War I in
particular, from the socialist point of view: "the master class has
always declared the wars and the subject class has always fought the
battles." He also expressed sympathy for several others already con-
victed and imprisoned for their opposition to the war, saying as to Rose
Pastor Stokes "if she was guilty so was he." Justice Holmes, in a curious
show of empathy, quotes several other passages from the speech and
from Debs's statement to the jury: "Don't worry about the charge of
treason to your masters; but be concerned about the treason that in-
4 Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (1917).
5 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
6 The law may finally have worked itself pure. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 895 U.S. 444
(1969).
7 The prison sentence was commuted by President Harding in 1921, but Debs's citizen-
ship was not restored.
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Professor Ernst Freund
volves yourselves." "I have been accused of obstructing the war. I admit
it. Gentlemen, I abhor war. I would oppose the war if I stood alone."8
The speech then fell into the genre of bitter criticism of government
and government policy, sometimes called seditious libel; freedom of
such criticism from government censorship marks, we have come to
understand, "the central meaning of the First Amendment.", During
the Vietnam War thousands of utterances strictly comparable in bitter-
ness and sharpness of criticism, if not in literacy, were made; it was
pretty much taken for granted they were beyond the reach of govern-
ment.
There is just one more detail for our brief. Debs at the time of the
speech was a national political figure. He was to run for President
the following year on the Socialist ticket and, although in prison at
the time, was to receive almost 900,000 votes, a considerable fraction
of all votes cast in the 1920 election. To put the case in modem con-
text, it is somewhat as though George McGovern had been sent to
prison for his criticism of the war.
The Debs case thus put a vital, practically important test of political
dissent to the Court and the Constitution. The Court's almost laconic
affirmance of the conviction raises serious question as to what the first
amendment, and more especially, what the clear and present danger
formula can possibly have meant at the time. Justice Holmes devotes
only a single clause to the defendant's constitutional objections, noting
merely that they were "disposed of in Schenck v. United States." He
does not comment on the fact difference between the cases: the defen-
dant in Schenck had sent his leaflets directly to men who awaited draft
call whereas the defendant in Debs was addressing a general audience
at a public meeting. Holmes offers no discussion of the sense in which
Debs's speech presented a clear and present danger.'0 He shows no
8 249 U.S. at 214.
9 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964); see Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169 (1972); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1968); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
10 While Justice Holmes does not pause to evaluate the danger from Debs's speech,
he does, as Professor Freund notes, comment specifically on Debs's intention. After quoting
Debs's statements to the jury about his hatred and abhorrence of war, Holmes observes:
The statement was not necessary to warrant the jury in finding that one purpose
of the speech, whether incidental or not does not matter, was to oppose not only
war in general but this war, and that the opposition was so expressed that its natural
and intended effect would be to obstruct recruiting. If that was intended and if, in
all the circumstances, that would be its probable effect, it would not be protected
by reason of its being part of a general program and expressions of a general and
conscientious belief.
Holmes's immediate concern at this point in the opinion is construing the federal statute
and establishing that there was sufficient evidence of intention to permit a finding that
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sensitivity to accommodating a tradition of political dissent, a sensi-
tivity which had so characterized Hand's opinion two years earlier in
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten," and makes no effort to suggest the
parameters of improper criticism of the war. In fact the case did not
move Justice Holmes to discuss free speech at all; his brief opinion
is occupied with two points about admissibility of certain evidence at
the trial. It was for Holmes a routine criminal appeal.
It was for Professor Freund, however, a dismal, and alarming, answer
to the question of "freedom of agitation in wartime." His contemporary
reaction to the decision serves to put into sharper focus the puzzles
about Justice Holmes and the origins of the first amendment tradition.
The Freund article makes it clear that the outcome in Debs was per-
ceived as dangerously unsound by sophisticated legal intelligence of
the day. If read with hindsight, Debs, as we said, now makes little sense
and impeaches claims to serious freedom of speech; the Freund article
shows that, read at the time, Debs made equally little sense.
Professor Chafee, after acknowledging that the Debs case came as a
shock to many Holmes admirers, offered an explanation. "Looking
backward, however, we see that Justice Holmes was biding his time
until the Court should have before it a conviction so clearly wrong
as to let him speak his deepest thoughts about the First Amendment."
In the meantime Holmes, Chafee argues, by joining the majority in
Schenck had been able to announce, with the backing of a unanimous
Supreme Court, the rule of "clear and present danger." One more
sentence, and Chafee's "benign plot" is completed. "The opportunity
for which Justice Holmes had been waiting came eight months after
Debs went to prison in Abrams v. United States."' 2
Professor Chafee is in one sense certainly correct. In Abrams,13
Holmes in dissent was moved to a burst of eloquence about free speech
that was to enrich and permanently to alter the constitutional tradition
of the first amendment. Afterwards, Debs is conveniently forgotten and
the dissenting Abrams eloquence is read back into Schenck as though
it had been there all the time. But however we interpret the sequence
of precedents, we confront a blunt question, which the New Republic
piece so dramatically underscores: What can it mean about Justice
Holmes that it was Abrams and not Debs that finally stirred him to
speak seriously about freedom of speech?
Debs had violated the statute. He offers no clue as to how intention and clear and present
danger are related as tests of the first amendment.
11 244 F. 535 (1917).
12 Z. Ci"A.EE, supra note 2, at 86.
13 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
[40:235
The Debs Case
Ernst Freund has been a legendary figure for The University of
Chicago Law School and its alumni. As one of the original faculty, he
was a major architect of the school and a major source of its national
visibility. He is remembered for his pioneer work in administrative
law, comparative law, and legislation, and for his generous view of the
scope of legal education.14 As the New Republic article shows, he is to
be remembered, too, as a legal scholar playing a gallant role as public
citizen. How welcome it is to know that amidst the patriotic pressures
of World War I he could have written this sentence:
But stamp a man like Debs or a woman like Kate O'Hare as
felons and you dignify the term felony instead of degrading them,
and every thief and robber will be justified in feeling that some of
the stigma has been taken from his crime and punishment.
The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech*
Ernst Freund
After the affirmance of his conviction by the Supreme Court, Mr.
Debs issued a statement to the effect that the real issue, the constitution-
ality of the Espionage law, had not been decided, and such seems to be
the general impression. As a matter of fact the decision raises inevitably
the question of the freedom of agitation in war time. The offense of
which Debs was convicted was obstruction of recruiting; the acts proved
were a violent attack upon the war, its motives and objects, and the
approval of the conduct and attitude of persons who had been convicted
of like offenses; and from this evidence the jury was permitted to find a
tendency and an intent to obstruct recruiting. There was nothing to
show actual obstruction or an attempt to interfere with any of the
processes of recruiting. How can it be denied that the upholding of such
a finding upon such evidence involves the question of the limits of
permissible speech? If verbal or written opposition to the war, however
violent or unwarranted, can be stretched to mean a form of obstruction,
then Congress strikes at utterances as effectually through punishing ob-
struction as though it punished utterances directly. Not only is to this
extent the restraint of speech clearly sanctioned by the Supreme Court,
but it is made to rest on judicial interpretation rather than upon
legislation.
I shall not attempt to determine what in the way of restraint is
14 See Allen, Preface to E. FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION (1965 ed.).
* Reprinted from THE NEw REPUBLIC, MAY 3, 1919, at 13.
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